Chapter 2 (The Seekers Joy at Self-Cognizance): Verse 15
ज्ञानं ज्ञेयं तथा ज्ञाता त्रितयं नास्ति वास्तवम् ।
अज्ञानाद्भाति यत्रेदं सोऽहमस्मि निरञ्जनः ॥ २-१५॥
ज्ञानं ज्ञेयं तथा ज्ञाता त्रितयं नास्ति वास्तवम् ।
अज्ञानाद्भाति यत्रेदं सोऽहमस्मि निरञ्जनः ॥ २-१५॥
PURPORT:
Knowledge, the knower and the knowable,
this set of three, in reality, do not exist.
I am that unsullied being, in which this triad
manifests through distracted ignorance.
Knowledge, the knower and the knowable,
this set of three, in reality, do not exist.
I am that unsullied being, in which this triad
manifests through distracted ignorance.
TRANSLITERATION:
ज्ञानम् ज्ञेयम् तथा ज्ञाता त्रितयम् न अस्ति वास्तवम् ।
jñānam jñeyam tathā jñātā tritayam na asti vāstavam ।
अज्ञानात् भाति यत्र इदम् सः अहम् अस्मि निरञ्जनः ॥ २-१५॥
ajñānāt bhāti yatra idam saḥ aham asmi nirañjanaḥ ॥ 2-15॥
ज्ञानम् ज्ञेयम् तथा ज्ञाता त्रितयम् न अस्ति वास्तवम् ।
jñānam jñeyam tathā jñātā tritayam na asti vāstavam ।
अज्ञानात् भाति यत्र इदम् सः अहम् अस्मि निरञ्जनः ॥ २-१५॥
ajñānāt bhāti yatra idam saḥ aham asmi nirañjanaḥ ॥ 2-15॥
MEANING:
jñānam (ज्ञानम्) = knowledge/intelligence/expertise
jñeyam (ज्ञेयम्) = knowable/intelligibleness/that which can be learned or ascertained or perceived
tathā (तथा) = as well as
jñātā (ज्ञाता) = knower/perceiver/the one who knows
tritayam (त्रितयम्) = triad/troika/set of three/triplet
na (न) = not
asti (अस्ति) = is
vāstavam (वास्तवम्) = in reality/in truth/genuine ।ajñānāt (अज्ञानात्) = from ignorance/from inexperience/through incomprehension
bhāti (भाति) = appears/to pass for/to manifest in a mistaken manner
yatra (यत्र) = where
idam (इदम्) = this ('this' as in the troika of knowledge, knowable and the knower)
saḥ (सः) = that
aham (अहम्) = I
asmi (अस्मि) = am
nirañjanaḥ (निरञ्जनः) = pure/spotless/unsullied/immaculate॥ 2-15॥
jñānam (ज्ञानम्) = knowledge/intelligence/expertise
jñeyam (ज्ञेयम्) = knowable/intelligibleness/that which can be learned or ascertained or perceived
tathā (तथा) = as well as
jñātā (ज्ञाता) = knower/perceiver/the one who knows
tritayam (त्रितयम्) = triad/troika/set of three/triplet
na (न) = not
asti (अस्ति) = is
vāstavam (वास्तवम्) = in reality/in truth/genuine ।ajñānāt (अज्ञानात्) = from ignorance/from inexperience/through incomprehension
bhāti (भाति) = appears/to pass for/to manifest in a mistaken manner
yatra (यत्र) = where
idam (इदम्) = this ('this' as in the troika of knowledge, knowable and the knower)
saḥ (सः) = that
aham (अहम्) = I
asmi (अस्मि) = am
nirañjanaḥ (निरञ्जनः) = pure/spotless/unsullied/immaculate॥ 2-15॥
COMMENT:
From an epistemological* perspective, our perceived reality consists of three aspects, the knowledge itself (the object), the one know knows (the subject) and the realm of the knowable (the object arena perceived by the subject). In our conditioned reality handed down to us through education, stored memories, past experiences and societal interactions, we routinely recognize ourselves to be the knower (the subject or the one who knows). The accumulation of knowledge and our subjective understanding of such knowledge ultimately results in the formulation of a self-model always based upon this recognition as the knower (a self-model that considers itself alien and separate from our surroundings).
While on the subject of knowledge and the knower, a relevant little digression is helpful: it might be useful to quickly differentiate between the structure (the brain), the process (the mind) and consciousness (the emergent self-model within the structure as a result of the process). Brain is the physical structure. A dependent biological emergence from neurons, chemical complexes and electric potentials. Mind is the process - a dependent process emergent from the underlying structure - an amalgam of emotions, thoughts, experiences and memories modulated by emotions and other sensory stimuli. Consciousness is the emergent phenomena whose intimate and ultimate manifestation results in the development of a self-model in humans. Each of these three components are present in every sentient being, the degrees differ (while the structure itself might be there, the mind and the consciousness emerge in limited quantities within sentients other than humans).
One of the ways by which consciousness manifests itself is via the ever-constant and incessant, though automatic, arising of thoughts within our mind. As an example, let us consider the arising of a psychological sensation within our consciousness - say the feeling of hatred (the arising of the feeling of hatred itself is dependent upon multiple underlying inter-connected causal conditions that variously depend upon sensory stimuli, predispositions, conditioning, predilections and memories). In response to this psychological sensation, thoughts within us would autonomously assemble unremitting mental variations such as "This is hatred," or "I feel hatred," or "I am hatred." The very first thought variation announces a separation from the phenomenological sensation of hatred and produces a deluded feeling that there is an observer. Hatred as a separate sensation from the observer of the phenomenon of the sensation. The second thought variation alludes to the fact that there is a separate self endowed with appropriate qualities, characteristics and virtues; a self onto which the attribute of 'hatred' was just manifested and projected. The self thus is seen as experiencing the characteristic of hatred. If 'hatred' goes away, the self still remains - or so, it is inferred - leading to the separation of the self from the characteristic. The third thought variation identifies the self as one and the same with the attribute of 'hatred' at-that-moment. The separation and duality experienced in the third variation is subtle - as the self infers that at-this-moment, the self is synonymous with hatred, but there-are-other-moments where there are other attributes like love, hate or anger that the self can potentially be correlated with - leading to the feeling of separation of the self with those other attributes. All of the three variations of thought presented above inherently affirm their dualistic, albeit alienating nature where the self is separate - in the first case, the knower is separate from the knowledge; in the second case, the knower is separate from a property of knowledge and in the third, the knower is separate from any other attributes other than the one the knower is experiencing. In all of these three cases, there is a separation and the creation of a sense of self separate from the knowledge within the knowable. In these beautiful lines, Janaka makes clear that he understands that there is no separation between the knowledge, the realm of the knowable and the supposed self (the knower) perceiving the knowable. Janaka understands that the separation arises out of a sense of illusory immersion within the world of thoughts that spring up from the mental processes - mental processes that are hallucinatory at best and pernicious at worst. Janaka also realizes that the self only reinforces its sense of permanence within these thoughts created out of the notions, biases, impressions and perceptions propagating within the mental processes. Thus, he joyously proclaims that the triad; of knowledge, the knower and the knowable, in reality, does not exist and he is just a being onto which this triad manifests only through distracted ignorance.
From an epistemological* perspective, our perceived reality consists of three aspects, the knowledge itself (the object), the one know knows (the subject) and the realm of the knowable (the object arena perceived by the subject). In our conditioned reality handed down to us through education, stored memories, past experiences and societal interactions, we routinely recognize ourselves to be the knower (the subject or the one who knows). The accumulation of knowledge and our subjective understanding of such knowledge ultimately results in the formulation of a self-model always based upon this recognition as the knower (a self-model that considers itself alien and separate from our surroundings).
While on the subject of knowledge and the knower, a relevant little digression is helpful: it might be useful to quickly differentiate between the structure (the brain), the process (the mind) and consciousness (the emergent self-model within the structure as a result of the process). Brain is the physical structure. A dependent biological emergence from neurons, chemical complexes and electric potentials. Mind is the process - a dependent process emergent from the underlying structure - an amalgam of emotions, thoughts, experiences and memories modulated by emotions and other sensory stimuli. Consciousness is the emergent phenomena whose intimate and ultimate manifestation results in the development of a self-model in humans. Each of these three components are present in every sentient being, the degrees differ (while the structure itself might be there, the mind and the consciousness emerge in limited quantities within sentients other than humans).
One of the ways by which consciousness manifests itself is via the ever-constant and incessant, though automatic, arising of thoughts within our mind. As an example, let us consider the arising of a psychological sensation within our consciousness - say the feeling of hatred (the arising of the feeling of hatred itself is dependent upon multiple underlying inter-connected causal conditions that variously depend upon sensory stimuli, predispositions, conditioning, predilections and memories). In response to this psychological sensation, thoughts within us would autonomously assemble unremitting mental variations such as "This is hatred," or "I feel hatred," or "I am hatred." The very first thought variation announces a separation from the phenomenological sensation of hatred and produces a deluded feeling that there is an observer. Hatred as a separate sensation from the observer of the phenomenon of the sensation. The second thought variation alludes to the fact that there is a separate self endowed with appropriate qualities, characteristics and virtues; a self onto which the attribute of 'hatred' was just manifested and projected. The self thus is seen as experiencing the characteristic of hatred. If 'hatred' goes away, the self still remains - or so, it is inferred - leading to the separation of the self from the characteristic. The third thought variation identifies the self as one and the same with the attribute of 'hatred' at-that-moment. The separation and duality experienced in the third variation is subtle - as the self infers that at-this-moment, the self is synonymous with hatred, but there-are-other-moments where there are other attributes like love, hate or anger that the self can potentially be correlated with - leading to the feeling of separation of the self with those other attributes. All of the three variations of thought presented above inherently affirm their dualistic, albeit alienating nature where the self is separate - in the first case, the knower is separate from the knowledge; in the second case, the knower is separate from a property of knowledge and in the third, the knower is separate from any other attributes other than the one the knower is experiencing. In all of these three cases, there is a separation and the creation of a sense of self separate from the knowledge within the knowable. In these beautiful lines, Janaka makes clear that he understands that there is no separation between the knowledge, the realm of the knowable and the supposed self (the knower) perceiving the knowable. Janaka understands that the separation arises out of a sense of illusory immersion within the world of thoughts that spring up from the mental processes - mental processes that are hallucinatory at best and pernicious at worst. Janaka also realizes that the self only reinforces its sense of permanence within these thoughts created out of the notions, biases, impressions and perceptions propagating within the mental processes. Thus, he joyously proclaims that the triad; of knowledge, the knower and the knowable, in reality, does not exist and he is just a being onto which this triad manifests only through distracted ignorance.
*Epistemology is the study of the nature of knowledge, justification, and the rationality of belief. Epistemology addresses such questions as: "What makes justified beliefs justified?", "What does it mean to say that we know something?", and fundamentally "How do we know that we know?" Example: In mathematics, it is known that 2 + 2 = 4, but there is also knowing how to add two numbers, and knowing a person (e.g., knowing other persons, or knowing oneself), place (e.g., one's hometown), thing (e.g., cars), or activity (e.g., addition). Some philosophers think there is an important distinction between "knowing that" (know a concept), "knowing how" (understand an operation), and "acquaintance-knowledge" (know by relation), with epistemology being primarily concerned with the first of these.
Via James, William, The Principles of Psychology: Volume One, Henry Holt and Company, (New York), 1890: "I am acquainted with many people and things, which I know very little about, except their presence in the places where I have met them. I know the color blue when I see it, and the flavor of a pear when I taste it; I know an inch when I move my finger through it; a second of time, when I feel it pass; an effort of attention when I make it; a difference between two things when I notice it; but about the inner nature of these facts or what makes them what they are, I can say nothing at all. I cannot impart acquaintance with them to any one who has not already made it himself I cannot describe them, make a blind man guess what blue is like, define to a child a syllogism, or tell a philosopher in just what respect distance is just what it is, and differs from other forms of relation. At most, I can say to my friends, Go to certain places and act in certain ways, and these objects will probably come."
Via James, William, The Principles of Psychology: Volume One, Henry Holt and Company, (New York), 1890: "I am acquainted with many people and things, which I know very little about, except their presence in the places where I have met them. I know the color blue when I see it, and the flavor of a pear when I taste it; I know an inch when I move my finger through it; a second of time, when I feel it pass; an effort of attention when I make it; a difference between two things when I notice it; but about the inner nature of these facts or what makes them what they are, I can say nothing at all. I cannot impart acquaintance with them to any one who has not already made it himself I cannot describe them, make a blind man guess what blue is like, define to a child a syllogism, or tell a philosopher in just what respect distance is just what it is, and differs from other forms of relation. At most, I can say to my friends, Go to certain places and act in certain ways, and these objects will probably come."
NOTES:
"The three: subject / perceiver, action / perception, object / perceived world cannot exist independently of each other, inherently, and meet once in a while. They are inseparable / interdependent / co-dependent / co-emergent / co-evolving / co-ceasing / non-dual ... <==> thus empty of inherent existence. Empty but still dependent on their causes and conditions and relatively functional." - Gilles Therrien
No comments:
Post a Comment